Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Sqlservr Spawning Shell

Status
production
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic detects instances where the sqlservr.exe process spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell process. This behavior is often indicative of command execution initiated from within the SQL Server process, potentially due to exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities or the use of extended stored procedures like xp_cmdshell.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate administrative activities or monitoring tools might occasionally spawn command shells from sqlservr.exe. Review the process command-line arguments and consider filtering out known legitimate processes or users.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Sqlservr Spawning Shell
id: d33aac9f-030c-4830-8701-0c2dd75bb6cb
version: 7
creation_date: '2025-02-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: This analytic detects instances where the sqlservr.exe process spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell process. This behavior is often indicative of command execution initiated from within the SQL Server process, potentially due to exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities or the use of extended stored procedures like xp_cmdshell.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.parent_process_name="sqlservr.exe" `process_cmd`
        OR
        `process_powershell`
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_sqlservr_spawning_shell_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, you need to be ingesting endpoint data that captures process creation events, specifically the parent-child process relationships. Ensure that you are collecting Sysmon Event ID 1 or Windows Event Log Security 4688 events. The data should be mapped to the Endpoint data model in Splunk.
known_false_positives: Legitimate administrative activities or monitoring tools might occasionally spawn command shells from sqlservr.exe. Review the process command-line arguments and consider filtering out known legitimate processes or users.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/001/
    - https://github.com/MHaggis/notes/tree/master/utilities/SQLSSTT
analytic_story:
    - SQL Server Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1505.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.parent_process_name="sqlservr.exe" `process_cmd`
    OR
    `process_powershell`
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_sqlservr_spawning_shell_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "Cmd.Exe" corpus 81 (sigma 43, elastic 21, splunk 17)
  • "PowerShell.EXE" corpus 138 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 24)
  • "powershell_ise.EXE" corpus 51 (splunk 30, sigma 18, elastic 3)
  • "pwsh.dll" corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "sqlservr.exe" corpus 3 (elastic 2, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "powershell_ise.exe" corpus 52 (splunk 29, elastic 23)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:eq