Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist

name: Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist
id: 09d88404-1e29-46cb-806c-1eedbc85ad5d
version: 9
creation_date: '2022-12-06'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows OS tool klist.exe, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process details. Monitoring klist.exe is significant as it can indicate attempts to list or gather cached Kerberos tickets, which are crucial for lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to move laterally within the network or escalate privileges, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name="klist.exe"
        OR
        Processes.original_file_name = "klist.exe" Processes.parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell*")
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_steal_or_forge_kerberos_tickets_klist_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/winPEAS
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
analytic_story:
    - Windows Post-Exploitation
    - Prestige Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1558
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/winpeas/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit