Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Suspicious Child Process of Consent.EXE

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects unexpected child processes spawned by consent.exe, the Windows UAC consent dialog binary. Consent.exe is responsible solely for rendering the UAC elevation prompt and should not spawn child processes under normal operating conditions; child process creation from this parent is a known indicator of UAC bypass and privilege escalation techniques. The detection identifies any executable launched as a child of consent.exe, excluding the expected WerFault.exe error reporting process, which may legitimately appear in crash scenarios. This behavior is associated with UAC bypass exploits and has been observed in multiple post-exploitation frameworks as a means of obtaining elevated privileges without triggering a visible UAC prompt.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate software installations or system updates may occasionally trigger child processes under consent.exe but these should be rare. Verify any flagged activity against known administrative actions or recent software changes.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Suspicious Child Process of Consent.EXE
id: 8194b5d4-41ae-4ce7-adfb-92d375e341d2
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-30'
modification_date: '2026-07-30'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects unexpected child processes spawned by consent.exe, the Windows UAC consent dialog binary.
    Consent.exe is responsible solely for rendering the UAC elevation prompt and should not spawn child processes under normal operating conditions; child process creation from this parent is a known indicator of UAC bypass and privilege escalation techniques.
    The detection identifies any executable launched as a child of consent.exe, excluding the expected WerFault.exe error reporting process, which may legitimately appear in crash scenarios.
    This behavior is associated with UAC bypass exploits and has been observed in multiple post-exploitation frameworks as a means of obtaining elevated privileges without triggering a visible UAC prompt.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.parent_process_name="consent.exe"
    Processes.process_name="*.exe"
    NOT Processes.process_name="WerFault.exe"
    
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
       Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_child_process_of_consent_exe_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate software installations or system updates may occasionally trigger child processes under consent.exe but these should be rare.
    Verify any flagged activity against known administrative actions or recent software changes.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/cve-2024-30051/112618/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Suspicious Child of [$parent_process_path$] activity observed on [$dest$] via [$process$] executed by [$user$]
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Windows Privilege Escalation
    - Unusual Processes
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1068
    - T1548.002
    - T1059
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.parent_process_name="consent.exe"
Processes.process_name="*.exe"
NOT Processes.process_name="WerFault.exe"

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
   Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_suspicious_child_process_of_consent_exe_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.process_nameeq"WerFault.exe"excludes:Processes.process_name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "consent.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "*.exe" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"process_name" kind:eq