Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer

name: Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer
id: 2d4470ef-7158-4b47-b68b-1f7f16382156
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with WebShell activity on web servers. It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
            Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe", "dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe", "net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe", "ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe", "scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe")
            AND
            Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe")
        )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
    - https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 10
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 10
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Flax Typhoon
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - HAFNIUM Group
    - CISA AA22-264A
    - ProxyShell
    - SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability
    - ProxyNotShell
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489
    - Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1505.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit