Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer

Status
production
Severity
informational
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with WebShell activity on web servers. It detects when processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash.exe are spawned by web server processes such as w3wp.exe or nginx.exe. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer
id: 2d4470ef-7158-4b47-b68b-1f7f16382156
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of suspicious processes typically associated with WebShell activity on web servers. It detects when processes like `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `bash.exe` are spawned by web server processes such as `w3wp.exe` or `nginx.exe`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary exploiting a web application vulnerability to install a WebShell, providing persistent access and command execution capabilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised server, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive data.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE (
            Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe", "dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe", "net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe", "ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe", "scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe")
            AND
            Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe")
        )
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
    - https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 10
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 10
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - $parent_process_name$ spawned $process_name$ on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Flax Typhoon
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - HAFNIUM Group
    - CISA AA22-264A
    - ProxyShell
    - SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability
    - ProxyNotShell
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489
    - Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1505.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count max(_time) as lastTime, min(_time) as firstTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE (
        Processes.process_name IN ("arp.exe","at.exe","bash.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","cmd.exe","cscript.exe", "dsget.exe","dsquery.exe","find.exe","findstr.exe","fsutil.exe","hostname.exe","ipconfig.exe","ksh.exe","nbstat.exe", "net.exe","net1.exe","netdom.exe","netsh.exe","netstat.exe","nltest.exe","nslookup.exe","ntdsutil.exe","pathping.exe", "ping.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","qprocess.exe","query.exe","qwinsta.exe","reg.exe","rundll32.exe","sc.exe", "scrcons.exe","schtasks.exe","sh.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","tracert.exe","ver.exe","vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe","whoami.exe","wmic.exe","wscript.exe","wusa.exe","zsh.exe")
        AND
        Processes.parent_process_name IN ("w3wp.exe", "http*.exe", "nginx*.exe", "php*.exe", "php-cgi*.exe","tomcat*.exe")
    )
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_process_namein
  • "http*.exe"
  • "nginx*.exe"
  • "php*.exe"
  • "php-cgi*.exe"
  • "tomcat*.exe"
  • "w3wp.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 8)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:in
Processes.process_namein
  • "arp.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 8, splunk 1)
  • "at.exe" corpus 4 (elastic 3, splunk 1)
  • "bash.exe"
  • "bitsadmin.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 21, splunk 2)
  • "certutil.exe" corpus 44 (elastic 38, splunk 6)
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 67 (elastic 65, splunk 2)
  • "dsget.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 8)
  • "dsquery.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 8, splunk 4)
  • "find.exe"
  • "findstr.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "fsutil.exe" corpus 7 (splunk 4, elastic 3)
  • "hostname.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "ipconfig.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 9, splunk 1)
  • "ksh.exe"
  • "nbstat.exe"
  • "net.exe" corpus 28 (elastic 26, splunk 2)
  • "net1.exe" corpus 39 (elastic 20, splunk 19)
  • "netdom.exe"
  • "netsh.exe" corpus 21 (elastic 14, splunk 7)
  • "netstat.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 8, splunk 1)
  • "nltest.exe" corpus 11 (elastic 9, splunk 2)
  • "nslookup.exe" corpus 6 (elastic 3, splunk 3)
  • "ntdsutil.exe" corpus 5 (elastic 4, splunk 1)
  • "pathping.exe"
  • "ping.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 8, splunk 2)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "qprocess.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 8)
  • "query.exe" corpus 5 (splunk 3, elastic 2)
  • "qwinsta.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 8, splunk 1)
  • "reg.exe" corpus 27 (elastic 18, splunk 9)
  • "rundll32.exe" corpus 126 (elastic 100, splunk 26)
  • "sc.exe" corpus 32 (elastic 17, splunk 15)
  • "schtasks.exe" corpus 30 (elastic 19, splunk 11)
  • "scrcons.exe"
  • "sh.exe"
  • "systeminfo.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 9)
  • "tasklist.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 10)
  • "tracert.exe" corpus 6 (elastic 6)
  • "ver.exe"
  • "vssadmin.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 6, splunk 3)
  • "wevtutil.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 6, splunk 4)
  • "whoami.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 10, splunk 2)
  • "wmic.exe" corpus 66 (elastic 39, splunk 27)
  • "wscript.exe" corpus 83 (elastic 82, splunk 1)
  • "wusa.exe" corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • "zsh.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:in