Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Suspicious Driver Loaded Path

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
dest, dvc, image_loaded, process_hash, process_name, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.

Known false positives

  • Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 6: Driver loaded

Rule body

name: Windows Suspicious Driver Loaded Path
id: 2ca1c4a1-8342-4750-9363-905650e0c933
version: 9
creation_date: '2021-05-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 6
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*","\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\download*", "*\\appdata\\*") |  stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ImageLoaded dest dvc process_hash process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
    - https://whiteknightlabs.com/2025/11/25/discreet-driver-loading-in-windows/
finding:
    title: Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - XMRig
    - CISA AA22-320A
    - AgentTesla
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - Snake Keylogger
    - Interlock Ransomware
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1543.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*","\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\download*", "*\\appdata\\*")

Stage 2: stats

| stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ImageLoaded dest dvc process_hash process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 6 corpus 6 (splunk 5, chronicle 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"6"
ImageLoadedin
  • "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*"
  • "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*"
  • "*Recycle.bin*"
  • "*\\PerfLogs\\*"
  • "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*"
  • "*\\Windows\\Media\\*"
  • "*\\appdata\\*"
  • "*\\download*"
  • "*\\temp\\*"
  • "*\\users\\public\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\debug\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\fonts\\*"
  • "\\Windows\\repair\\*"
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:in