Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Suspicious Driver Loaded Path
The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
| Privilege Escalation | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 6 | Driver loaded |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Suspicious Driver Loaded Path
id: 2ca1c4a1-8342-4750-9363-905650e0c933
version: 9
creation_date: '2021-05-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 6
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*","\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\download*", "*\\appdata\\*") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ImageLoaded dest dvc process_hash process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/
- https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
- https://whiteknightlabs.com/2025/11/25/discreet-driver-loading-in-windows/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- XMRig
- CISA AA22-320A
- AgentTesla
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Snake Keylogger
- Interlock Ransomware
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1543.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/xmrig_miner/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded IN("*\\windows\\fonts\\*", "*\\users\\public\\*", "*\\windows\\debug\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Windows\\Media\\*","\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\download*", "*\\appdata\\*")
Stage 2: stats
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by ImageLoaded dest dvc process_hash process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ImageLoaded | in |
|