Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Suspicious Named Pipe
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation, persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
Known false positives
- False positives should be rare, investigate matches and apply additional filters as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth | |
| Lateral Movement |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 17: PipeEvent (Pipe Created) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 18: PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) |
Rule body
name: Windows Suspicious Named Pipe
id: 3a76d52f-a007-4a65-a37d-f313c2c83f31
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-12-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 17
- Sysmon EventID 18
search: |
`sysmon`
EventCode IN (17, 18)
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
"*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
"System",
)
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path
pipe_name user_id process_name signature signature_id vendor_product
| lookup suspicious_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, type, description
| where isnotnull(tool)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_named_pipe_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name and pipename from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon,
you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: |
False positives should be rare, investigate matches and apply additional filters as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
finding:
title: An instance of $process_name$ located in $process_path$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ accessing known suspicious named pipe $pipe_name$.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
- BlackByte Ransomware
- Brute Ratel C4
- Cobalt Strike
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Gozi Malware
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
- Hellcat Ransomware
- LockBit Ransomware
- Meterpreter
- Remote Monitoring and Management Software
- Trickbot
- Tuoni
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1559
- T1021.002
- T1055
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
EventCode IN (17, 18)
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Google*",
"*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*",
"*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*",
"*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*",
"System",
)
Stage 2: stats
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
count by dest dvc process_exec process_guid process_id process_path
pipe_name user_id process_name signature signature_id vendor_product
Stage 3: lookup
| lookup suspicious_named_pipes suspicious_pipe_name AS pipe_name OUTPUT tool, type, description
Stage 4: where
| where isnotnull(tool)
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_suspicious_named_pipe_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process_path | in | "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Adobe*", "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Google*", "*:\\Program Files \(x86\)\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Program Files\\Adobe*", "*:\\Program Files\\Google*", "*:\\Program Files\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "*:\\Windows\\SystemApps\\Microsoft*", "*:\\Windows\\system32\\SearchIndexer.exe", "*\\Amazon\\SSM\\Instance*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Kingsoft\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft*", "System" | excludes:process_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | in |
| field:"EventID" kind:in |
tool | is_not_null | field:"tool" kind:is_not_null |