Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Suspicious React or Next.js Child Process

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic detects Windows processes such as cmd.exe, PowerShell, and common Windows LOLBINs being spawned by React or Next.js application servers. In the context of CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell / CVE-2025-66478 for Next.js, successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server, which in turn is used to invoke Node's child_process APIs (for example child_process.execSync) to run OS-level commands. This detection focuses on suspicious child processes where a Next/React server process spawns an uncommon process. Such activity might be a strong indicator of exploitation of the aforementioned vulnerability.

Known false positives

  • Rare false positives might show up from child processes such as cmd or powershell. Apply additional filters as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

name: Windows Suspicious React or Next.js Child Process
id: baa80bc8-7c9c-4395-b458-b69feb92830a
version: 5
creation_date: '2025-12-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    This analytic detects Windows processes such as cmd.exe, PowerShell, and common Windows LOLBINs being spawned by React or Next.js application servers.
    In the context of CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell / CVE-2025-66478 for Next.js, successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server, which in turn is used to invoke Node's child_process APIs (for example child_process.execSync) to run OS-level commands.
    This detection focuses on suspicious child processes where a Next/React server process spawns an uncommon process.
    Such activity might be a strong indicator of exploitation of the aforementioned vulnerability.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
      from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      where
        Processes.parent_process_name = "node.exe"
        Processes.parent_process IN (
          "*--experimental-https*",
          "*--experimental-next-config-strip-types*",
          "*\\node_modules\\next*",
          "*next dev*",
          "*next start*",
          "*next\" start*",
          "*node_modules\\.bin\\\\..\\next*",
          "*react-scripts start*",
          "*start-server.js*",
        )
        AND
        (
          Processes.process_name IN (
            "bash.exe",
            "bitsadmin.exe",
            "calc.exe",
            "CalculatorApp.exe",
            "certutil.exe",
            "cscript.exe",
            "curl.exe",
            "ftp.exe",
            "ipconfig.exe",
            "mshta.exe",
            "netstat.exe",
            "OpenConsole.exe",
            "powershell.exe",
            "pwsh.exe",
            "regsvr32.exe",
            "rundll32.exe",
            "sh.exe",
            "tftp.exe",
            "wget.exe",
            "win32calc.exe",
            "wmic.exe",
            "wscript.exe",
            "wsl.exe",
            "wt.exe"
          )
          OR
          (
            Processes.process_name = "cmd.exe"
            AND NOT Processes.process = "*/d /s /c *"
          )
          OR
          (
            Processes.process_name = "cmd.exe"
            Processes.process = "*/d /s /c *"
            AND NOT (
              Processes.process = "*git config --local --get remote.origin.url*"
              OR
              (
                Processes.process = "*netstat -ano | findstr /C:*"
                Processes.process = "* | findstr LISTENING*"
              )
              OR
              (
                Processes.parent_process = "*--experimental-https*"
                Processes.process = "*\\mkcert\\*"
                Processes.process IN ("* -CAROOT*", "* -install *")
              )
            )
          )
        )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
       Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_react_or_next_js_child_process_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents.
    These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
    These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
    Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Rare false positives might show up from child processes such as cmd or powershell. Apply additional filters as needed.
references:
    - https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/03/critical-security-vulnerability-in-react-server-components
    - https://nextjs.org/blog/CVE-2025-66478
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55182
    - https://gist.github.com/maple3142/48bc9393f45e068cf8c90ab865c0f5f3
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/critical-vulnerability-in-react-cve-2025-55182
finding:
    title: A Node-based server process ($parent_process_name$) spawned the child process $process_name$ with command-line $process$ on host $dest$ by user $user$, which may indicate remote code execution via React Server Components (CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell) or abuse of a similar Node.js RCE vector.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A Node-based server process ($parent_process_name$) spawned the child process $process_name$ with command-line $process$ on host $dest$ by user $user$, which may indicate remote code execution via React Server Components (CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell) or abuse of a similar Node.js RCE vector.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: process
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: process_name
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - React2Shell
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1190
    - T1059.003
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
  from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  where
    Processes.parent_process_name = "node.exe"
    Processes.parent_process IN (
      "*--experimental-https*",
      "*--experimental-next-config-strip-types*",
      "*\\node_modules\\next*",
      "*next dev*",
      "*next start*",
      "*next\" start*",
      "*node_modules\\.bin\\\\..\\next*",
      "*react-scripts start*",
      "*start-server.js*",
    )
    AND
    (
      Processes.process_name IN (
        "bash.exe",
        "bitsadmin.exe",
        "calc.exe",
        "CalculatorApp.exe",
        "certutil.exe",
        "cscript.exe",
        "curl.exe",
        "ftp.exe",
        "ipconfig.exe",
        "mshta.exe",
        "netstat.exe",
        "OpenConsole.exe",
        "powershell.exe",
        "pwsh.exe",
        "regsvr32.exe",
        "rundll32.exe",
        "sh.exe",
        "tftp.exe",
        "wget.exe",
        "win32calc.exe",
        "wmic.exe",
        "wscript.exe",
        "wsl.exe",
        "wt.exe"
      )
      OR
      (
        Processes.process_name = "cmd.exe"
        AND NOT Processes.process = "*/d /s /c *"
      )
      OR
      (
        Processes.process_name = "cmd.exe"
        Processes.process = "*/d /s /c *"
        AND NOT (
          Processes.process = "*git config --local --get remote.origin.url*"
          OR
          (
            Processes.process = "*netstat -ano | findstr /C:*"
            Processes.process = "* | findstr LISTENING*"
          )
          OR
          (
            Processes.parent_process = "*--experimental-https*"
            Processes.process = "*\\mkcert\\*"
            Processes.process IN ("* -CAROOT*", "* -install *")
          )
        )
      )
    )
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
   Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_suspicious_react_or_next_js_child_process_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_processin
  • "*--experimental-https*" corpus 3 (sigma 2, elastic 1)
  • "*--experimental-next-config-strip-types*" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • "*\\node_modules\\next*"
  • "*next dev*" corpus 3 (sigma 2, elastic 1)
  • "*next start*" corpus 3 (sigma 2, elastic 1)
  • "*next\" start*"
  • "*node_modules\\.bin\\\\..\\next*"
  • "*react-scripts start*" corpus 3 (sigma 2, elastic 1)
  • "*start-server.js*" corpus 3 (sigma 2, elastic 1)
field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:in
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "node.exe" corpus 4 (elastic 3, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "*/d /s /c *" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:eq
Processes.process_namein
  • "CalculatorApp.exe"
  • "OpenConsole.exe"
  • "bash.exe"
  • "bitsadmin.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 21, splunk 2)
  • "calc.exe"
  • "certutil.exe" corpus 44 (elastic 38, splunk 6)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 67 (elastic 65, splunk 2)
  • "curl.exe" corpus 34 (elastic 31, splunk 3)
  • "ftp.exe" corpus 5 (elastic 5)
  • "ipconfig.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 9, splunk 1)
  • "mshta.exe" corpus 84 (elastic 79, splunk 5)
  • "netstat.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 8, splunk 1)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "regsvr32.exe" corpus 73 (elastic 68, splunk 5)
  • "rundll32.exe" corpus 126 (elastic 100, splunk 26)
  • "sh.exe"
  • "tftp.exe"
  • "wget.exe" corpus 6 (elastic 6)
  • "win32calc.exe"
  • "wmic.exe" corpus 66 (elastic 39, splunk 27)
  • "wscript.exe" corpus 83 (elastic 82, splunk 1)
  • "wsl.exe" corpus 4 (elastic 4)
  • "wt.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:in