Detection rules › Splunk
Windows TeamCity Payload Execution from Temp Directory
Detects the bundled TeamCity java executing a payload out of the temp directory. This activity can be associated with a malicious plugin installed by metasploit for remote code execution.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| Persistence | T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows TeamCity Payload Execution from Temp Directory
id: 937c59be-0975-4097-ae45-f07c894f9ff4
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
Detects the bundled TeamCity java executing a payload out of the temp directory.
This activity can be associated with a malicious plugin installed by metasploit for remote code execution.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process="*-classpath *"
Processes.process="*:\\Windows\\TEMP\\~spawn*"
Processes.process="*.tmp.dir *"
Processes.process="*.Payload*"
Processes.process="*TeamCity*"
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_teamcity_payload_execution_from_temp_directory_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate TeamCity operations or updates may occasionally run java processes from the temp directory. Review and filter based on verified TeamCity activity.
references:
- https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/critical-jetbrains-teamcity-on-premises.html
- https://github.com/sfewer-r7/metasploit-framework/blob/CVE-2024-27198/modules/exploits/multi/http/jetbrains_teamcity_rce_cve_2024_27198.rb
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/03/04/etr-cve-2024-27198-and-cve-2024-27199-jetbrains-teamcity-multiple-authentication-bypass-vulnerabilities-fixed/
drilldown_searches:
- earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Potential suspicious TeamCity activity observed on $dest$ via $process$.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process
type: process
analytic_story:
- JetBrains TeamCity Vulnerabilities
- JetBrains TeamCity Unauthenticated RCE
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1190
- T1505.003
- T1059
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1190/snapattack/snapattack.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process="*-classpath *"
Processes.process="*:\\Windows\\TEMP\\~spawn*"
Processes.process="*.tmp.dir *"
Processes.process="*.Payload*"
Processes.process="*TeamCity*"
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_teamcity_payload_execution_from_temp_directory_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
|