Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Time Based Evasion
The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n". Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks |
| Discovery | T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Time Based Evasion
id: 34502357-deb1-499a-8261-ffe144abf561
version: 14
creation_date: '2023-09-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n".
Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
Processes.process_name = "ping.exe"
(
Processes.parent_process IN (
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *"
)
OR
Processes.process IN (
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *"
)
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: A $process_name$ did a suspicious ping to invalid IP address on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- NjRAT
- BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1497.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/njrat_ping_delay_before_delete/ping_0.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
Processes.process_name = "ping.exe"
(
Processes.parent_process IN (
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *"
)
OR
Processes.process IN (
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *",
"*ping.exe 0 -n *"
)
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process | in |
|
Processes.process | in |
|
Processes.process_name | eq |
|