Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Time Based Evasion

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n". Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Time Based Evasion
id: 34502357-deb1-499a-8261-ffe144abf561
version: 14
creation_date: '2023-09-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects potentially malicious processes that initiate a ping delay using an invalid IP address.
    It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "ping 0 -n".
    Malware like NJRAT was observed using this technique to introduce time delays for evasion tactics, such as delaying self-deletion.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an active infection attempting to evade detection, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    Processes.process_name = "ping.exe"
    (
        Processes.parent_process IN (
            "*ping  0 -n *",
            "*ping 0 -n *",
            "*ping.exe  0 -n *",
            "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
        )
        OR
        Processes.process IN (
            "*ping  0 -n *",
            "*ping 0 -n *",
            "*ping.exe  0 -n *",
            "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
        )
    )
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.njrat
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A $process_name$ did a suspicious ping to invalid IP address on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - NjRAT
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1497.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1497.003/njrat_ping_delay_before_delete/ping_0.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.process_name = "ping.exe"
(
    Processes.parent_process IN (
        "*ping  0 -n *",
        "*ping 0 -n *",
        "*ping.exe  0 -n *",
        "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
    )
    OR
    Processes.process IN (
        "*ping  0 -n *",
        "*ping 0 -n *",
        "*ping.exe  0 -n *",
        "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
    )
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_time_based_evasion_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.parent_processin
  • "*ping 0 -n *"
  • "*ping 0 -n *"
  • "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
  • "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
Processes.processin
  • "*ping 0 -n *"
  • "*ping 0 -n *"
  • "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
  • "*ping.exe 0 -n *"
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "ping.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 7, splunk 2)