Detection rules › Splunk
Windows TOR Client Execution
The following analytic detects the execution of the TOR Browser and related TOR components on Windows endpoints by monitoring process creation activity. Adversaries and insider threats leverage TOR to anonymize command-and-control traffic, facilitate data exfiltration, and evade network monitoring and policy enforcement. While TOR can be used for legitimate research and privacy purposes, its presence on enterprise endpoints is often unusual and should be investigated to determine intent, scope, and any associated malicious behavior.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows TOR Client Execution
id: f164bc6f-ecbe-45e0-aaa6-f5c4d8c84b9a
version: 4
creation_date: '2026-02-02'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Vignesh Subramanian, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
The following analytic detects the execution of the TOR Browser and related TOR components on Windows endpoints by monitoring process creation activity.
Adversaries and insider threats leverage TOR to anonymize command-and-control traffic, facilitate data exfiltration, and evade network monitoring and policy enforcement.
While TOR can be used for legitimate research and privacy purposes, its presence on enterprise endpoints is often unusual and should be investigated to determine intent, scope, and any associated malicious behavior.
data_source:
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(
Processes.process_name = "tor.exe"
OR
(
Processes.process_path = "*\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser*"
Processes.process_path = "*\\tor-*"
)
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_tor_client_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: |
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
This detection focuses on TOR-related processes and may generate benign matches in environments where TOR is intentionally used, such as security testing, research, or lab environments.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tor-traffic-enterprise-networks/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: TOR client process $process_name$ was launched by parent process $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by the user $user$ with command line $process$
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: TOR client process $process_name$ was launched by parent process $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by the user $user$ with command line $process$
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process
type: process
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Windows Post-Exploitation
- Command And Control
- Data Exfiltration
- Data Protection
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1090.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1090.003/windows_tor_client_execution/windows-sysmon.log
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
(
Processes.process_name = "tor.exe"
OR
(
Processes.process_path = "*\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser*"
Processes.process_path = "*\\tor-*"
)
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_tor_client_execution_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.process_name | eq |
|
Processes.process_path | eq |
|