Detection rules › Splunk

Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects when an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation spawns a child process in a user-controlled location or a command shell executable (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 1 data, focusing on high or system integrity level processes with specific parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Child Process
id: 453a6b0f-b0ea-48fa-9cf4-20537ffdd22c
version: 12
creation_date: '2024-01-10'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects when an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation spawns a child process in a user-controlled location or a command shell executable (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 1 data, focusing on high or system integrity level processes with specific parent-child process relationships. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the entire system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND (Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript","cscript.exe","bash.exe","werfault.exe") OR Processes.process IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*","*\\Temp\\*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where parent_process_name != process_name | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_child_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: Target environment must ingest sysmon data, specifically Event ID 1 with process integrity level data.
known_false_positives: Including Werfault.exe may cause some unintended false positives related to normal application faulting, but is used in a number of UAC bypass techniques.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1548.002/
    - https://hadess.io/user-account-control-uncontrol-mastering-the-art-of-bypassing-windows-uac/
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A UAC bypass parent process- $parent_process_name$ on host- $dest$ launched a suspicious child process - $process_name$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A UAC bypass parent process- $parent_process_name$ on host- $dest$ launched a suspicious child process - $process_name$.
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
    - Living Off The Land
    - Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1548.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/uac_behavior/uac_behavior_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_integrity_level IN ("high","system") AND Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`) AND (Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript","cscript.exe","bash.exe","werfault.exe") OR Processes.process IN ("*\\\\*","*\\Users\\*","*\\ProgramData\\*","*\\Temp\\*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: where

| where parent_process_name != process_name

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_child_process_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.parent_process_namein
  • "BitlockerWizardElev.exe"
  • "CompMgmtLauncher.exe"
  • "EventVwr.exe"
  • "GWXUXWorker.exe"
  • "SystemPropertiesAdvanced.exe"
  • "TpmInit.exe"
  • "WSReset.exe"
  • "WerFault.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "cliconfg.exe"
  • "clipup.exe"
  • "cmstp.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "consent.exe"
  • "control.exe"
  • "credwiz.exe"
  • "dccw.exe"
  • "dismhost.exe"
  • "fodhelper.exe"
  • "inetmgr.exe"
  • "iscsicli.exe"
  • "mcx2prov.exe"
  • "migwiz.exe"
  • "mmc.exe" corpus 5 (elastic 3, splunk 1, kusto 1)
  • "msconfig.exe"
  • "oobe.exe"
  • "osk.exe"
  • "pkgmgr.exe"
  • "recdisc.exe"
  • "rstrui.exe"
  • "sdclt.exe"
  • "setupsqm.exe"
  • "slui.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "sysprep.exe"
  • "taskhost.exe"
  • "tzsync.exe"
  • "w32tm.exe"
  • "wusa.exe"
Processes.processin
  • "*\\ProgramData\\*"
  • "*\\Temp\\*" corpus 2 (chronicle 2)
  • "*\\Users\\*"
  • "*\\\\*" corpus 6 (sigma 5, splunk 1)
Processes.process_integrity_levelin
  • "high" corpus 21 (sigma 17, kusto 3, splunk 1)
  • "system" corpus 29 (sigma 22, splunk 4, elastic 3)
Processes.process_namein
  • "bash.exe"
  • "cmd.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • "cscript.exe" corpus 25 (elastic 23, splunk 2)
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 104 (elastic 60, splunk 44)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 62 (elastic 33, splunk 29)
  • "werfault.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "wscript"