Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior

name: Windows UAC Bypass Suspicious Escalation Behavior
id: 00d050d3-a5b4-4565-a6a5-a31f69681dc3
version: 14
creation_date: '2024-01-10'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects when a process spawns an executable known for User Account Control (UAC) bypass exploitation and subsequently monitors for any child processes with a higher integrity level than the original process.
    This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 1 data, focusing on process integrity levels and known UAC bypass executables.
    This activity is significant as it may indicate an attacker has successfully used a UAC bypass exploit to escalate privileges.
    If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to further system compromise and persistent access.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    Processes.process_integrity_level IN (
        "low",
        "medium"
    )
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    
    | eval original_integrity_level = CASE(
                match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,
                match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,
                match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,
                match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,
                true(),0
            )
    | rename process_guid as join_guid_1,
             process* as parent_process*
    
    | join max=0 dest join_guid_1 [
        | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
          count min(_time) as firstTime
        FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
        Processes.process_integrity_level IN (
            "high",
            "system"
        )
        Processes.process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`)
    
        BY Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_guid
           Processes.process_name Processes.process_guid
    
        | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
        | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_1,
                 process_guid as join_guid_2,
                 process_name as uac_process_name
    ]
    
    | join max=0 dest join_guid_2 [
        | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
          count min(_time) as firstTime
        FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
        Processes.parent_process_name IN (`uacbypass_process_name`)
        Processes.process_integrity_level IN (
            "high",
            "system"
        )
        BY Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_guid
           Processes.process_name Processes.process
           Processes.process_guid Processes.process_path
           Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_current_directory
    
        | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    
        | rename parent_process_guid as join_guid_2
    
        | eval elevated_integrity_level = CASE(
            match(process_integrity_level,"low"),1,
            match(process_integrity_level,"medium"),2,
            match(process_integrity_level,"high"),3,
            match(process_integrity_level,"system"),4,
            true(),0
        )
    ]
    | where elevated_integrity_level > original_integrity_level
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    Target environment must ingest sysmon data, specifically Event ID 1 with process integrity level data.
known_false_positives: |-
    Including Werfault.exe may cause some unintended false positives related to normal application faulting, but is used in a number of UAC bypass techniques.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
    - https://atomicredteam.io/defense-evasion/T1548.002/
    - https://hadess.io/user-account-control-uncontrol-mastering-the-art-of-bypassing-windows-uac/
    - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/
finding:
    title: A UAC bypass behavior was detected by process $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A UAC bypass behavior was detected by process $parent_process_name$ on host $dest$ by $user$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Living Off The Land
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1548.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint