Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
dest, object_file_name, process_id, process_name, signature_id, target_filename
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects unauthorized access to Outlook credentials stored in the Windows registry. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically EventCode 4663, to identify access attempts to registry paths associated with Outlook profiles. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts to steal sensitive email credentials, which could lead to unauthorized access to email accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information, impersonate users, or execute further unauthorized actions within Outlook, posing a significant security risk.

Known false positives

  • third party software may access this outlook registry.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential Access

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Unsecured Outlook Credentials Access In Registry
id: 36334123-077d-47a2-b70c-6c7b3cc85049
version: 14
creation_date: '2024-02-22'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects unauthorized access to Outlook credentials stored in the Windows registry. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically EventCode 4663, to identify access attempts to registry paths associated with Outlook profiles. This activity is significant as it may indicate attempts to steal sensitive email credentials, which could lead to unauthorized access to email accounts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information, impersonate users, or execute further unauthorized actions within Outlook, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4663
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN ("*\\Profiles\\Outlook\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*", "*\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*") AND process_name != *\\outlook.exe | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_unsecured_outlook_credentials_access_in_registry_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure."
known_false_positives: third party software may access this outlook registry.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/choice
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.404keylogger
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious process $process_name$ accessing outlook credentials registry on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - StealC Stealer
    - Snake Keylogger
    - Meduza Stealer
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - Lokibot
    - VIP Keylogger
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1552
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path IN ("*\\Profiles\\Outlook\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*", "*\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*") AND process_name != *\\outlook.exe

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path  process_id EventCode dest

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_unsecured_outlook_credentials_access_in_registry_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4663 corpus 35 (splunk 30, kusto 5)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4663"
object_file_pathin
  • "*\\Profiles\\Outlook\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*"
  • "*\\Windows Messaging Subsystem\\Profiles\\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676*"
field:"TargetFilename" kind:in
process_namene
  • *\\outlook.exe
field:"process_name" kind:ne value:"*\\outlook.exe"