Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos
The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code 0x12 (credentials revoked). This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, potentially leading to initial access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Active Directory environment.
Known false positives
- A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |
Rule body
name: Windows Unusual Count Of Disabled Users Failed Auth Using Kerberos
id: f65aa026-b811-42ab-b4b9-d9088137648f
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-04-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. It leverages EventCode 4768, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and detects failure code `0x12` (credentials revoked). This behavior is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, potentially leading to initial access or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access or elevate privileges within the Active Directory environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4768
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12
| bucket span=5m _time
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
BY _time, IpAddress
| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
BY IpAddress
| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
| search isOutlier=1
| `windows_unusual_count_of_disabled_users_failed_auth_using_kerberos_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$
threat_objects:
- field: IpAddress
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Password Spraying
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- Volt Typhoon
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1110.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12
Stage 2: bucket
| bucket span=5m _time
Stage 3: stats
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
BY _time, IpAddress
Stage 4: eventstats
| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
BY IpAddress
Stage 5: eval
| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
Stage 6: eval
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
isOutlier =if
unique_accounts > 10 AND unique_accounts >= upperBound1else
0Stage 7: search
| search isOutlier=1
Stage 8: search
| `windows_unusual_count_of_disabled_users_failed_auth_using_kerberos_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.