Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
_time, src_ip
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4771, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) due to a wrong password (failure code 0x18). This detection uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to identify unusual authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Auth Using Kerberos
id: bc9cb715-08ba-40c3-9758-6e2b26e455cb
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-04-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a source endpoint failing to authenticate multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Event 4771, which is generated when the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) due to a wrong password (failure code 0x18). This detection uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to identify unusual authentication failures. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4771
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!="*$" Status=0x18
      | bucket span=5m _time
      | stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
        BY _time, IpAddress
      | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
        BY IpAddress
      | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
      | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
      | search isOutlier=1
      | `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and multi-user systems like Citrix farms.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11)
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$
threat_objects:
    - field: IpAddress
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Password Spraying
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Volt Typhoon
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1110.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos_xml/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      name: True Positive Test
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 TargetUserName!="*$" Status=0x18

Stage 2: bucket

| bucket span=5m _time

Stage 3: stats

| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest
    BY _time, IpAddress

Stage 4: eventstats

| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
    BY IpAddress

Stage 5: eval

| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)

Stage 6: eval

| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
isOutlier =
ifunique_accounts > 10 AND unique_accounts >= upperBound1
else0

Stage 7: search

| search isOutlier=1

Stage 8: search

| `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_auth_using_kerberos_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4771 corpus 2 (splunk 2)
Statuseq
  • 0x18 corpus 2 (splunk 2)
TargetUserNamene
  • "*$" corpus 14 (splunk 14)
isOutliereq
  • 1 corpus 28 (splunk 28)