Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process
The following analytic identifies a source process failing to authenticate multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625, which logs failed logon attempts, and uses statistical analysis to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4625 | An account failed to log on. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Unusual Count Of Users Failed To Authenticate From Process
id: 25bdb6cb-2e49-4d34-a93c-d6c567c122fe
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-04-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a source process failing to authenticate multiple users, potentially indicating a Password Spraying attack. It leverages Windows Event 4625, which logs failed logon attempts, and uses statistical analysis to detect anomalies. This activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to gain initial access or elevate privileges within an Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could compromise multiple accounts, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4625
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!="-"
| bucket span=2m _time
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest values(src) as src
BY _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName,
Computer, action, app,
authentication_method, signature, signature_id
| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
BY ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer
| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
| search isOutlier=1
| `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$
- field: Computer
type: system
score: 20
message: Potential password spraying attack from $Computer$
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Password Spraying
- Insider Threat
- Volt Typhoon
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1110.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process_xml/windows-security.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
name: True Positive Test
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 ProcessName!="-"
Stage 2: bucket
| bucket span=2m _time
Stage 3: stats
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user values(dest) as dest values(src) as src
BY _time, ProcessName, SubjectUserName,
Computer, action, app,
authentication_method, signature, signature_id
Stage 4: eventstats
| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std
BY ProcessName, SubjectUserName, Computer
Stage 5: eval
| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
Stage 6: eval
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
isOutlier =unique_accounts > 10 AND unique_accounts >= upperBound10Stage 7: search
| search isOutlier=1
Stage 8: search
| `windows_unusual_count_of_users_failed_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
Logon_Type | eq |
|
ProcessName | ne |
|
isOutlier | eq |
|