Detection rules › Splunk
Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File
The following analytic detects the creation URL shortcut files, often used by malware like CHAOS ransomware. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify ".url" files created outside common directories, such as "Program Files". This activity can be significant as ".URL" files can be used as mean to trick the user into visiting certain websites unknowingly, or when placed in certain locations such as "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\", it may allow the execution of malicious code upon system reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to achieve persistence and execute harmful payloads, potentially leading to further system compromise and data loss.
Known false positives
- Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in this path.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule body
name: Windows User Execution Malicious URL Shortcut File
id: 5c7ee6ad-baf4-44fb-b2f0-0cfeddf82dbc
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-01-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation URL shortcut files, often used by malware like CHAOS ransomware. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify ".url" files created outside common directories, such as "Program Files". This activity can be significant as ".URL" files can be used as mean to trick the user into visiting certain websites unknowingly, or when placed in certain locations such as "\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\", it may allow the execution of malicious code upon system reboot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to achieve persistence and execute harmful payloads, potentially leading to further system compromise and data loss.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where NOT Filesystem.file_path IN ("*:\\Program Files\\*", "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Office\\Recent\\*", "*:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") Filesystem.file_name=*.url by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
known_false_positives: Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in this path.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/chaos-ransomware-variant-sides-with-russia
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: A process created a .URL shortcut file in $file_path$ of $dest$
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A process created a .URL shortcut file in $file_path$ of $dest$
analytic_story:
- XWorm
- Chaos Ransomware
- NjRAT
- Quasar RAT
- Snake Keylogger
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1204.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where NOT Filesystem.file_path IN ("*:\\Program Files\\*", "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Office\\Recent\\*", "*:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") Filesystem.file_name=*.url by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Filesystem.file_path | in | "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "*:\\Program Files\\*", "*:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Office\\Recent\\*" | excludes:Filesystem.file_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Filesystem.file_name | eq |
| field:"file_name" kind:eq |