Detection rules › Splunk
Windows VSSVC Process Accessing Defender Engine
Detects vssvc.exe opening a handle to MsMpEng.exe. In the RedSun exploit, VSS participates in the cloud-file restore race that directs WD to write through the NTFS junction. This handle acquisition is observed at the exact moment of exploitation. vssvc querying MsMpEng is not expected in normal operation.
Known false positives
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10: ProcessAccess |
Rule body
name: Windows VSSVC Process Accessing Defender Engine
id: 0c398be7-e33a-4882-9546-12166ceaf73c
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-01'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
Detects vssvc.exe opening a handle to MsMpEng.exe.
In the RedSun exploit, VSS participates in the cloud-file restore race that directs WD to write through the NTFS junction.
This handle acquisition is observed at the exact moment of exploitation.
vssvc querying MsMpEng is not expected in normal operation.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 10
search: |-
`sysmon`
EventCode=10
TargetImage="*\\MsMpEng.exe"
SourceImage="*\\vssvc.exe"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID
SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId
TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId
UserID dest CallTrace user_id parent_process_name
parent_process_guid process_name
process_guid process_id signature
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_vssvc_process_accessing_defender_engine_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
This search requires Sysmon Logs and a Sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10 for lsass.exe.
This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs.
Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter macro designed to filter out known false positives.
known_false_positives: |-
No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/RedSun
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/nightmare-eclipse-intrusion
finding:
title: Windows Process $SourceImage$ accessing $TargetImage$ on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- RedSun
- Windows Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1068
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2026-33825
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
EventCode=10
TargetImage="*\\MsMpEng.exe"
SourceImage="*\\vssvc.exe"
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID
SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId
TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId
UserID dest CallTrace user_id parent_process_name
parent_process_guid process_name
process_guid process_id signature
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_vssvc_process_accessing_defender_engine_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"10" |
SourceImage | eq |
| field:"SourceImage" kind:eq |
TargetImage | eq |
| field:"TargetImage" kind:eq |