Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Wermgr Alternate Data Stream in Temp Dir
The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating an alternate stream in the temp directory. It leverages Sysmon EventID 15 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
Known false positives
- No false positives have been identified at this time.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 15: FileCreateStreamHash |
Rule body
name: Windows Wermgr Alternate Data Stream in Temp Dir
id: 65222e9b-9d0b-4bfe-8da1-199b98e1d44a
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-06-11'
modification_date: '2026-06-11'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating an alternate stream in the temp directory. It leverages Sysmon EventID 15 to identify these actions.
This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 15
search: |-
`sysmon`
EventCode=15
TargetFilename = "*\\Temp\\*"
TargetFilename = "*\\wermgr.exe:*"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by dest dvc file_hash file_name file_path process_exec
process_guid process_id process_name process_path
signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Contents Image
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_wermgr_alternate_data_stream_in_temp_dir_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances of wermgr.exe may be used.
known_false_positives: |-
No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://github.com/MSNightmare/RoguePlanet/tree/main
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A [$process_name$] created a wermgr.exe alternate stream in the temp directory on $dest$ by $user$
analytic_story:
- RoguePlanet
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1564.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon`
EventCode=15
TargetFilename = "*\\Temp\\*"
TargetFilename = "*\\wermgr.exe:*"
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by dest dvc file_hash file_name file_path process_exec
process_guid process_id process_name process_path
signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Contents Image
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_wermgr_alternate_data_stream_in_temp_dir_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"15" |
TargetFilename | eq |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:eq |