Detection rules › Splunk

WSReset UAC Bypass

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects a suspicious modification of the registry aimed at bypassing User Account Control (UAC) by leveraging WSReset.exe. It identifies the creation or modification of specific registry values under the path "\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\Shell\open\command". This detection uses data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and registry events. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques can allow attackers to execute high-privilege actions without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: WSReset UAC Bypass
id: 8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a suspicious modification of the registry aimed at bypassing User Account Control (UAC) by leveraging WSReset.exe. It identifies the creation or modification of specific registry values under the path "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*". This detection uses data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and registry events. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques can allow attackers to execute high-privilege actions without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 12
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
    - https://blog.morphisec.com/trickbot-uses-a-new-windows-10-uac-bypass
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
    - Living Off The Land
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - MoonPeak
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1548.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548/uac_bypass/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*" AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Registry.registry_patheq
  • "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*"
Registry.registry_value_nameeq
  • "(Default)" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
  • "DelegateExecute"